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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the progress in EU product market integration by analyzing price 
differentials in a multivariate framework for 22 industrialised economies and almost 
200 product categrories. Using the so-called Grubel-Lloyd index, we model changes in 
bilateral price similarities as a function of initial bilateral similarity levels, bilateral 
trade intensities, the bilateral correlation between expenditure shares and various 
variables reflecting EU membership, product category, the tradability of the product and 
the presence of non-tariff barriers throughout 1985-1999. The results suggest that price 
structures within the EU are more similar than among other OECD countries, especially 
for energy products and consumer goods. After correcting for factors such as catching-
up and trade intensities, prices in the EU have almost consistently converged faster than 
in the rest of the OECD. Finally, we find that the countries in the so-called D-Mark area 
have witnessed a significantly stronger tendency for prices to converge than countries 
which have had relatively higher exchange rate fluctuations. This gives some 
foundation to hopes that monetary union will promote price convergence, especially 
because private agents probably have not attributed as much credibility to the EMS 
arrangement (even in the countries with relatively stable bilateral exchange rates) as a 
full monetary union such as EMU might have. 
 
 
JEL Codes: L16; E31. Keywords: Price convergence, market integration. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The move to economic and monetary union and the introduction of the euro form the 
crown on two decades of structural policies in the European Union (EU) aimed at 
promoting market integration and increasing competition. These policy initiatives 
include the establishment of the Single European Market, changes in (national and 
European) competition policies and EU -directives liberalising domestic markets in areas 
such as telecommunications, postal services, air and railroad transport, electricity and 
gas. Technological change was a strong driving force of these changes in policies as 
new technologies made new, innovative forms of competition possible (e.g. competition 
on fixed telephony networks), thereby raising the costs of policy inaction. It is widely 
believed that, once completed, this process of product market integration will lead to 
significant benefits for European consumers, in terms of the quality, the variety and the 
price of goods and services sold in the EU, improving overall living standards.2 
 
Although competition has increased in many sectors, domestic regulatory barriers still 
seem significant in many countries, especially in some service industries and public 
procurement, lessening the impact of trade integration and liberalisation on product 
market competition (Haffner and van Bergeijk, 1997). The still large scope for 
improvement in these areas has also been recognised by the heads of state and 
government of the European Union. At their 2000 (“dotcom”) summit in Lissabon, they 
noted that Europe was lagging behind in many areas, most notably in information and 
communication technologies. At Lissabon, they formulated the objective to make the 
European economy “the most competitive economy in the world by 2010”.  
 
This paper reviews the progress which has been achieved in increasing EU product 
market integration. To this end, we analyze price differentials as an indicator of product 
market integration. This is based on the theoretical notion of the “law of one price”. 
This law states that in a perfectly integrated market with no transport costs, competition 
between suppliers and arbitrage by consumers should eliminate price divergences. 
Therefore, prices for identical goods should not differ geographically. Although for a 
number of macro- and microeconomic reasons3, price differences are not expected to be 
eliminated completely, a reduction in price differences (or more similar price structures) 
among EU-countries can, in part, be attributed to increased competition and market 
integration. The elimination of barriers to trade by the single market programme and 
other regulatory reforms should erode market power, raise the possibilities for arbitrage 
                                                                 
2  See Van Bergeijk and Haffner (1996). OECD (1997) estimates of the expected impact of 
regulatory reform in five sectors of the European economy (telecommunications, 
electricity, airlines, road transport and distribution) point to expected gains ranging from 
3% of GDP in Sweden to 6% of GDP in Spain. 
3  See Rogoff (1996) for a survey. Among them are the presence of transport and 
distribution costs, arbitrage and search costs, differences in regulatory and fiscal systems 
between countries, state aid, collusive behaviour of firms and movements in exchange 
rates. 
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and reduce the potential for price discrimination across EU-markets. In the absence of 
new collusive behaviour, increased integration should result in more active price 
competition, leading to more similar price structures.  
 
In the following, we focus on the similarity between price structures and their 
convergence over time, comparing developments in both EU and other OECD 
countries. The paper builds on earlier work on price convergence4 and incorporates 
newly available data on prices in the OECD area.5 One of the reults of the earlier study 
was that price convergence in the EU had slowed down in 1993-1996, after having 
controlled for differences in initial conditions and some OECD-wide trends in price 
convergence. In this paper, we assess the development in the speed of price 
convergence in the EU over a longer timeframe, adding an extra three-year period 
(1996-1999) to the investigation. Secondly, the question can be asked which types of 
products (e.g. tradeable-nontradeable) have achieved the highest degree of price 
convergence, and whether trade barriers have had an impact on convergence. Finally, 
we look at the importance of the exchange rate regime for the degree of price 
convergence. Specifically, it is useful to see whether those EU -countries where (in the 
past) exchange rates have been relatively stable witnessed a stronger tendency for prices 
to converge (e.g. due to greater transparency of prices quoted in national currencies) 
than countries which have had relatively wide exchange rate fluctuation bands or 
frequently adjusted central rates. This question is especially relevant as it may provide 
information on the degree of price convergence which may be brought about by EMU.  
 
Paragraph 2 below provides a cursory review of the evidence on price convergence in 
the EU. We look at aggregate price levels and variations in prices among major product 
categories. In paragraph 3, the patterns of price similarity are analysed by looking at the 
determinants of convergence in a multivariate framework. Paragraph 4 compares the 
differences in price convergence between EU-countries with a relatively high degree of 
exchange rate stability, with the performance of countries which have not enjoyed this 
benefit. Paragraph 5 discusses the conclusions of the paper. 
 
2.  Evidence on EU price convergence 
 
Aggregate indicators of the level of product prices suggest that price disparities are 
significant in the EU (Table 1).6 Since 1985, there has been some convergence in 
aggregate price levels, as implied by the decline in the standard deviation. However, the 
ranking of member states’ price levels has remained relatively stable since 1985. The 
rank correlation is high (0,93); only four member states have moved more than two 
places up or down the ranking.  
                                                                 
4  Nicoletti et al (2001). 
5  See OECD (2002). 
6  EC (1999b) report that price disparities (as measured by the coefficient of variation) are 
about 40% higher in the EU than in the United States. 
9 
Table 1: Price levels in the EU 
 
Country 1985 1999 
 (EU12=100) rank (EU15=100) rank 
Austria 108 6 103 8 
Belgiu m  101 9 101 9 
Denmark 124 3 120 1 
Finland 130 1 108 3 
France 109 5 105 7 
Germany 113 4 106 6 
Greece 75 13 77 14 
Ireland 103 7 100 10 
Italy 92 12 87 12 
Luxembourg 98 10 107 4 
Netherlands 103 7 97 11 
Portugal 52 15 69 15 
Spain 75 13 81 13 
Sweden 127 2 119 2 
UK 98 10 107 4 
Memorandum:     
Standard deviation 21,0  14,8  
Rank correlation (85-99)  0,93   
Sources:: EC (2001) and OECD (2002). 
 
Some of the cross-country price differences may be explained by differences in living 
standards. Indeed, preliminary regressions show that up to 60% of the variation in 
aggregate price levels (including taxes) in the EU can be explained by differences in 
GDP per capita (Figure 1, upper panel). Probably due to lagging productivity in 
services, countries with a  relatively higher living standard (and a higher share of 
 
Figure 1: Price levels, price convergence and GDP/capita in the EU 
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the service sector) tend to have a relatively higher price level. This is confirmed in the 
lower panel of Figure 1, which shows the change in the aggregate price level over the 
period 1985-1999 in relation to living standards in 1985. Countries with the lowest 
living standard in 1985 had the highest increase in prices, which is an illustration of the 
catch-up effect. Differences in indirect taxation may also explain some of the 
differences in price levels. However, as EC (2001) notes, the ranking of countries’ 
aggregate price levels is not much affected by the use of pre- or post-tax data. Based on 
the aggregate price data presented in Table 1 and Figure 1, some price convergence has 
taken place. The question remains, however, whether the aggregate convergence also 
implies that price structures have become more similar. Only if price structures also 
become more similar can aggregate price convergence be interpreted as a sign of 
product market integration. Moreover, it is not clear against which benchmark the price 
convergence in the EU can be assessed.  
 
For this reason, we below use much more detailed price data which we use to assess 
convergence in the EU with convergence among other OECD-economies. The analysis 
is made using the data on Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures produced 
by Eurostat and the OECD in the context of the United Nations International 
Comparisons Project, which provides the prices of about 200 categories of goods and 
services observed in 1985, 1990, 1993, 1996 and 1999. These data are in turn based on 
extensive price surveys for product categories of equal characteristics and quality, 
collected by the various national statistical services. The “benchmark years” for which 
data are available, are the years for which all the basic heading purchasing power 
parities have been recalculated with new survey data since the previous benchmark. 
Purchasing power parities data in between benchmark years are based on extrapolation 
of previous benchmark data and are therefore less reliable. 
 
It should be noted that the comparability of price data over time forms a serious caveat 
to the type of analysis presented in this paper. Firstly, product categories across 
countries may not be completely identical. Differences in preferences, for example, may 
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be a reason why some product varieties are widely available in one country, but not in 
another. Secondly, improvements in data collection methods and changes in the 
composition of product categories make intertemporal comparisons more difficult. 
Although Eurostat and the OECD have tried to ensure a maximum of comparability, it 
could not be avoided that national accounts methods, expenditure classifications, data 
collection and pricing procedures have evolved, mostly as a result of improved methods 
and data sources. The composition of the product categories under consideration have 
also changed somewhat, either because new products have appeared, others have 
disappeared, and many other products have undergone improvements in quality. Finally, 
it should be noted that although the empirical analysis makes use of price data for 
almost 200 product categories, the level of aggregation may still be too high to fully 
capture the process of price convergence. Ideally, the analysis of price convergence 
should be made for relevant antitrust market, which would ensure that all relevant 
substitutes are included in a particular product category (Haffner and van Bergeijk, 
1998). Such an analysis might well reveal a considerable degree of heterogeneity at the 
level of individual products. However, the data used in this paper are the best ones 
available. They were composed by the national statistical agencies, Eurostat and the 
OECD with great care and are widely used to make price comparisons and to 
investigate broad price trends. We therefore look at our results with some confidence.  
However, the data used in this paper are the best ones available, and are widely used in 
making price comparisons and to investigate broad trends as done in this paper.  
 
To analyse the degree of price convergence, we borrow a similarity measure familiar 
from the trade literature. We use the so-called Grubel-Lloyd index, which is originally a 
measure of the degree of intra -industry trade, to look at bilateral price similarities across 
countries and country groups.7 This approach has several advantages over earlier ones 
focusing on the degree of overall price dispersion, as measured for instance by the 
coefficient of variation (see EC, 2001). Firstly, it allows a direct comparison of price 
similarity between (groups of) countries, which is not possible with the more commonly 
used coefficient of variation. Whereas the coefficient of variation has no clear upper 
bound, the similarity index ranges between 0 (completely different price structures) and 
100 (identical prices for all products). It takes both differences in price levels and in the 
composition of prices into account. Secondly, the similarity index has the additional 
advantage that it can be easily used in a multivariate framework. This makes it possible 
                                                                 
7  The similarity index between countries j and k is: 
 100*
n
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to check whether convergence (or the lack of it) may be explained by economic factors, 
such as initial conditions, trade intensity or barriers to trade. 
 
Table 2 summarises some of the characteristics of our dataset. We use three different 
classifications of price data. Firstly, we distinguish between goods and services as 
classified at the basic expenditure heading, consisting of consumer goods, equipment 
goods, construction, services and energy. Services on balance have the highest average 
share in OECD nominal expenditure, closely followed by consumer goods. Secondly, 
we look at price similarity based on the tradability of the product categories involved. 
Roughly half of the average OECD-wide expenditures are on tradables. Finally, we 
classify products according to the degree of regulatory barriers to trade. These can 
potentially be powerful obstacles to cross-border competition and may therefore 
contribute to explain price disparities within the OECD and maybe even within the 
Single Market. We distinguish between products for which at the beginning of the 
nineties, the degree of non-tariff barriers (NTB) was “high”, “medium” and “low”, 
respectively, based on information of the European Commission (see EC (1997a)).8 
Products in the category with low NTB’s have the highest average share in expenditure.  
 
Table 2: Data statistics 
 
Category OECD 
Expenditure 
share 
Number of 
product 
categories 
Examples 
Consumer 
goods 
36% 96 Rice, pasta products, beer, 
refrigerators 
Equipment 
goods 
11% 21 Tools for metal working, 
boilermaking 
Construction 14% 11 Single family dwellings, industrial 
buildings 
Services 37% 51 Insurance, repair, postal services 
Energy 2,5% 5 Electricity, gas, solid fuels  
Tradables 49% 122 Consumer goods, equipment and 
energy 
Nontradeables 51% 62 Services and construction 
High NTB’s 8,3% 20 Locomotives, boats, pharmaceuticals  
Medium NTB’s 11,9% 55 Agricultural machinery, mining 
equipment 
Low NTB’s 21,4% 31 Bicycles; motorcycles, cigarettes 
Note: total number of observations and expenditure shares are lower for NTB-categories, 
because information on type of trade-barrier was not always available. 
                                                                 
8 Information on NTB's in the late 1980s and early 1990s was gathered by EC (1997a) 
drawing on a questionnaire among 11,000 European enterprises and a horizontal study of 
technical barriers in six industries. The information was used to classify industrial sectors 
into three groups according to the overall impact of NTB's.  
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Table 3 summarises unweighted (gross of tax) price similarities and their development 
over the 1985-1999 period for both EU and non-EU. The degree of price similarity is 
substantially higher among EU countries than among non-EU countries, confirming that 
the EU is a relatively highly integrated area. Prices in the EU have also converged more 
throughout the period, although only slightly. About half of the price convergence in the 
EU has taken place in the most recent period, 1996-1999, and even more than half in the 
rest of the OECD. The table also shows large differences in similarity and convergence 
between different product categories. Within the EU, prices structures for consumer 
goods are the most similar, while prices for services are least similar. In the non-EU-
area, price similarity is relatively low in the energy and services sectors. For both EU 
and non-EU-countries, the equipment goods sector has a relatively high degree of price 
similarity, and the levels of price similarity are quite similar (88 for the EU versus 87,3 
for non-EU). This indicates that it the equipment goods sector may have become an 
international or even global market. The overall degree of price similarity is 
significantly lower for non-tradable goods (80,6 for non-tradables versus 86,3 for 
tradables within the EU), demonstrating the considerable scope for price convergence in 
the non-tradable sector. For the non-EU countries, a similar picture emerges. 
 
Table 3: Price similarity for some categories of products, 1985-1999 (unweighted) 
 
 1985 1990 1993 1996 1999 Change 
 
      1996-1999 1985-1999 
EU        
All products 81,9 81,5 84,5 84,6 87,0 2,4 5,1 
   Consumer goods 82,9 82,2 86,0 85,9 89,3 3,4 6,4 
   Equipment 
goods 
88,5 88,1 88,6 89,8 88,0 ¾1,8 ¾0,5 
   Construction 85,3 85,0 85,9 84,8 84,5 ¾0,3 ¾0,8 
   Services 75,2 76,1 79,4 79,5 82,4 2,9 7,2 
   Energy 84,1 78,3 77,2 79,1 84,6 5,5 0,5 
Tradables 83,9 83,1 86,1 86,3 88,8 2,5 4,9 
Non-tradables 76,7 77,2 80,3 80,6 82,8 2,2 6,1 
Other OECD        
All products 75,3 78,2 75,7 76,4 80,3 3,9 5,0 
   Consumer goods 77,1 79,9 76,9 76,7 81,5 4,8 4,4 
   Equipment 
goods 
80,0 80,7 82,0 85,7 87,3 1,6 7,3 
   Construction 70,9 81,4 75,8 79,3 80,5 1,2 9,6 
   Services 69,2 72,7 70,2 71,0 75,6 4,6 6,4 
   Energy 76,1 73,4 71,0 72,3 75,3 3,0 ¾0,8 
Tradables  77,4 79,8 77,5 78,0 82,0 4,0 4,6 
Non-tradables 69,8 74,3 71,0 72,6 76,5 3,9 6,7 
Other OECD = Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Turkey and United States. 
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Table 4 shows our price similarity indices according to the presence of non-tariff 
barriers. Significant progress towards price similarity has been achieved in the EU for 
both high and low-NTB sectors, while the other OECD countries mainly achieved 
progress in the high and medium NTB sectors.9 These results suggest that the Single 
Market programme successfully increased EU market integration and succeeded in 
reducing price disparities in those markets which were more regulated at the start of the 
programme. A counter-intuitive result is that, especially in the EU, price similarity is 
higher for the medium NTB-category than for the low NTB-category. This may be due 
to the fact that markets characterised by medium NTB's are mainly equipment goods 
markets which show a higher similarity of prices due to their highly traded nature (see 
also Tables 2 and 3).  
 
Table 4: Price similarity according to NTB categories, 1985-1999 (unweighted) 
 
 1985 1990 1993 1996 1999 Change 
 
      1996-1999 1985-1999 
EU        
High NTB 82,0 81,3 85,1 85,5 88,1 2,6 6,1 
Medium NTB 88,0 86,8 88,1 88,5 89,9 1,4 1,9 
Low NTB 82,2 81,9 85,9 85,8 88,7 2,9 6,5 
Other 
OECD 
       
High NTB 76,7 80,4 78,9 81,3 83,1 1,8 6,4 
Medium NTB 76,7 77,2 80,3 80,6 83,9 3,3 7,2 
Low NTB 76,4 79,1 76,7 76,2 80,7 4,5 4,3 
Other OECD = Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Turkey and United States . 
 
Table 5 shows some examples of the country pairs with relatively similar and relatively 
dissimilar prices. As to be expected, the country pairs with the highest price similarities 
are the neighbouring European countries with (generally) close trade relations. Among 
the least similar price structures, the inclusion of Japan and Turkey seems to lower the 
average price similarity. Of the 12 country pairs with dissimilar prices, nine of them 
include Japan and three of them include Turkey. 
 
Looking at the overall results, price convergence in the EU has mainly taken place in 
1990-1993 and 1996-1999 (see Figure 2). During other periods, price convergence 
almost stopped or even reversed. For the other OECD-countries, prices continuously 
converged with the notable exception of the 1990-1993 period, which provided a 
substantial setback. Only after more than six years does price similarity for non-EU 
countries return to its 1990 level. In the next section, we try to explain developments in 
price convergence by looking at some of their determinants. 
                                                                 
9   The results for non-EU countries should be interpreted with caution as the NTB-
classification was derived for EU sectors only. 
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Table 5: Country pairs of most and least similar price structures, all goods, 1999 
 
Twelve most similar price structures (Similarity index>90,3) 
Austria-Belgium Germany-Netherlands Ireland-UK 
Austria-Germany Belgium-Netherlands Denmark-Finland 
Belgium-Germany France-Germany Portugal-Spain 
Italy-Spain Belgium-France Austria-France 
Twelve least similar price structures (Similarity index <70,9) 
Japan-Turkey Japan-New Zealand Greece-Japan 
Norway-Turkey Denmark-Turkey Japan-USA 
Japan-Portugal Japan-Spain Australia-Japan 
Sweden-Turkey Canada-Japan Italy-Japan 
 
 
Figure 2: Change in (unweighted) price similarity of all products (1985-1999) 
 
 
3. Price convergence in a multivariate framework 
 
The respective roles of initial conditions and EC integration and liberalisation 
programmes can be elucidated by looking at the determinants of price convergence in a 
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headings, tradeability and the NTB classification.10 The equations were estimated using 
the aggregate similarity measures (including all products) as well as panels  of similarity 
measures relative to goods included in specific product categories (i.e. consumer goods, 
construction, equipment goods, energy, services; or high NTB, medium NTB, low 
NTB; or tradables and non tradables). The sample size changes accordingly. 
 
The degree of price similarity at the start of the period is included to measure a “catch-
up” effect. The assumption is that the prices of country pairs showing a larger initial gap 
will converge faster than those of country pairs in which prices were already quite 
similar at the beginning of the period. This may occur when the gap is due to a 
difference in initial development levels. Since price levels in more highly developed 
countries tend to be relatively high (as confirmed in Figure 1), faster convergence in 
income levels would also imply faster convergence in prices.11 Alternatively, it may 
reflect the fact that relatively more far-reaching and difficult reforms have to be 
implemented to achieve further progress in countries which already have similar prices, 
thereby slowing down the rate of convergence. We therefore expect the coefficient of 
this variable to have a negative sign.  
 
Other factors potentially affecting the speed of convergence can be motivated as 
follows. The bilateral trade intensity variable (the sum of the bilateral imports, scaled 
with the sum of the bilateral GDPs) should catch the effect of bilateral trade relations on 
price convergence. Countries having intense trade relations are expected to be able to 
reach a higher degree of price similarity (e.g. due to price arbitrage) than countries 
which do not have such relations. The trade variable can also be seen as a proxy for 
                                                                 
10  The general form of the estimated equation is: 
constdummy5aeu4ashare3atrade2aktsim1aktsimtsim +++++---
where the dependent variable is the change in the (weighted or unweighted) price 
similarity  of the price structures of two countries (3£k£14), “similarity t-k ” is the 
degree of price similarity between the two countries at the start of the period, “trade” is a 
measure of the bilateral trade intensity, “share” is a measure of the bilateral correlation 
between expenditure shares, “EU” is a dummy -variable which has the value one if both 
countries are part of the EU and zero otherwise, “dummy” is a dummy variable 
measuring the effect of the kind of product (consumer goods, energy, services, 
construction, and equipment goods), the level of NTB’s (high, medium or low) and the 
tradability of the product (tradable versus non-tradables) and “c” is a constant. 
11   This can be attributed to the Balassa-Samuelson effect of lagging productivity growth in 
services: countries with a higher living standard (which generally coincides with a higher 
share of the service sector) tend to have a relatively high aggregate price level. 
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relative distance, transport costs and even cultural differences which may also act as 
trade barriers.12  
 
The bilateral correlation between expenditure shares is used to control for the effect of 
differences in consumer preferences. For example, prices in one country may be higher 
simply because consumers have a relatively high demand for particular product varieties 
which are relatively expensive. Demand may be relatively inelastic, allowing producers 
to earn a relatively high profit margin. Including the correlation between the 
expenditure shares should (at least in part) correct for these effects. However, it should 
be noted that a low correlation in expenditure shares between countries may also be the 
result of a lack of competition in one of the two countries and/or regulatory or other 
barriers preventing price arbitrage. In any case, we expect a positive sign for this 
variable.  
 
Dummy variables for the different product categories are included to control for the 
types of products (consumer goods, energy, services, construction, and equipment 
goods), the level of NTB’s (high, medium or low) and the tradability features (tradable 
versus non-tradables). A dummy variable is also included to test whether, once 
controlling for initial conditions and other factors affecting the speed of convergence, 
prices have converged at a significantly higher rate among EU-countries than among 
non-EU countries. 
 
The results of cross-section OLS estimates of this equation using as the dependent 
variable the average change in (both unweighted and weighted) similarity over the 
1985-1999 period are shown in Table 6.13. Each column shows a different specification 
of the equation: columns 1 and 2 present the basic equation with unweighted and 
weighted similarity indices, respectively; columns 3 through 6 check the contribution of 
each basic heading for EU-countries and non-EU countries, respectively, column 7 
checks for convergence according to tradablility; column 8 according to the presence of 
non-trade barriers and column 9 shows results for the most recent period only. 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. As expected, the level of 
price similarity in 1985 has a significant negative effect on the increase in similarity. 
This effect proves to be particularly robust across all types of specifications and 
provides evidence for the catch-up hypothesis.14 Countries with relatively dissimilar 
price structures have therefore tended to achieve much more progress in price 
convergence than countries which already had a high level of similarity.  
 
                                                                 
12  We use the logarithm of this variable since it displays a considerable variance, ranging 
from almost zero (e.g. between Australia and Greece) to 7,1% for the trade between 
Belgium and the Netherlands. Data on aggregate bilateral trade flows refers to 1990 and 
1994.  
13  Luxembourg is excluded in the regressions due to a lack of trade data. 
14  Using the logarithm of the initial similarity level produces the same qualitative results. 
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Table 6: Bilateral convergence equations  
 
Dependent 
variable 
Change in price similarity 
(average 1985-1999) 
Specification/ 
Independent 
variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
   Uw         W      W         Uw    W           W              W             W           W 
countries all all all EU EU non-EU EU EU EU  
         1996-99 
Similarity 1985 -0,4 
(-7,5) 
-0,5 
(-10,5) 
-0,5 
(-22,4) 
-0,5 
(-14,2) 
-0,6 
(-17,5) 
-0,5 
(-15,9) 
-0,5 
(-19,1) 
-0,7 
(-19,3) 
-0,3 
(-8,8) 
Trade intensity -0,3 
(-1,3) 
-0,5 
(-1,8) 
       
Expenditure 
share 
2,0 
(1,6) 
4,4 
(3,2) 
2,7 
(3,3) 
1,6 
(1,9) 
2,0 
(2,1) 
2,8 
(2,4) 
4,5 
(2,4) 
3,0 
(2,8) 
2,5 
(3,2) 
EU-variable 3,7 
(6,3) 
4,7 
(7,1) 
3,6 
(8,3) 
      
Construction   -3,1 
(-4,3) 
-5,3 
(-6,6) 
-6,5 
(-7,3) 
-0,6 
(-0,6) 
  -2,3 
(-3,0) 
Equipment 
goods 
  2,0 
(3,0) 
-3,1 
(-4,1) 
-2,4 
(-2,9) 
5,3 
(5,5) 
  -1,4 
(-2,1) 
Energy   -6,5 
(-10,9) 
-5,0 
(-7,2) 
-5,9 
(-7,5) 
-7,0 
(-7,5) 
  -2,4 
(-3,5) 
Services   0,4 
(0,6) 
-2,5 
(-3,3) 
-1,3 
(-1,5) 
1,6 
(1,6) 
  -0,2 
(-0,3) 
High NTB        -1,4 
(-3,4) 
 
Medium NTB        -0,5 
(-1,1) 
 
Tradable       0,6 
(0,8) 
  
constant 28,2 
(7,6) 
35,8 
(10,0) 
41,9 
(20,9) 
46,2 
(15,1) 
51,7 
(17,8) 
38,0 
(14,2 
45,1 
(19,3) 
60,4 
(21,1) 
26,0 
(8,3) 
Observations 210 210 1050 455 455 595 182 273 455 
R2 (adjusted) 28,4 43,5 45,0 50,4 59,3 42,4 70,0 63,5 23,0 
Notes: T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
The intensity of bilateral trade relations has a negative sign in the estimations: countries 
with intensive bilateral trade relations tend to show relatively little price convergence. 
The reason may be that their (initial) level of similarity is generally high and, possibly, 
regulatory barriers impede further convergence. This coefficient is not always 
significant, which may be explained by the fact that it plays a similar role as the initial 
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similarity variable.15 The bilateral correlation between the expenditure shares (an 
indicator of closeness of preferences) is also significant and correctly signed in most 
specifications.  
 
Comparing the weighted and unweighted specifications, no obvious differences in 
overall explanatory power seem to be present. However, the weighted specifications 
seem to be the more relevant ones, as they put more weight on those product categories 
which on average have a higher share of expenditures. Note however that the weights 
themselves may be influenced by factors not included on the right hand side (such as 
collusive behaviour or regulatory barriers).  
 
Taking a closer look at the results at the basic heading level (see equation 3), these show 
that the EU-variable is significant and the coefficient is of the same order of magnitude 
as in specifications 1 and 2. However, a problem with equation 3 may be that it 
implicitly restricts the development in price similarity among the basic heading 
categories to be the same in EU - and non-EU countries. This assumption may not be 
valid. To test whether the sub-samples of EU and non-EU countries can be combined, 
separate regressions were performed for EU and non-EU countries. The error sum of 
squares of the separate regressions were compared with the error sum of squares of a 
regression for the whole sample where the coefficients were restricted to be equal.16 The 
test statistic (Pindyk and Rubinfeld, 1991) which has an F-distribution shows that 
equality of coefficients at the basic heading level can clearly be rejected. The same 
holds for the regression with proxies for the presence of non-tariff barriers. Only in the 
regressions with the tradability-variable it was not possible to reject the hypothesis of 
equality of coefficients. In order to look at patterns of price convergence for specific 
product categories, it is therefore on balance more appropriate to estimate separate 
regressions for EU and non-EU-countries.  
 
Separate equations for EU- and non-EU-countries are presented in Table 6, columns 4 
through 8. The results indicate that: 
· Within the EU, price convergence was highest for consumer goods, followed by 
services, equipment goods, energy and construction (see specifications 4 and 5). The 
differences between the weighted and unweighted specifications are not large. The 
fact that price convergence for consumer goods has been higher than for services is 
                                                                 
15  This is confirmed by leaving out the initial similarity variable and including only the 
trade variable. The trade variable becomes highly significant, but the overall explanatory 
power of this specification is much lower. This does not affect the coefficient of the EU-
variable, however. 
16  As our goal is to test whether price convergence at the basic heading level displays a 
significantly different pattern among EU-countries and non-EU-countries, we correct for 
the higher average rate of price convergence among EU-countries (compared to non-EU-
countries). This was done by subtracting the estimated coefficient for the EU-variable 
from the EU-observations of the dependant variable and then re-estimating the three 
equations with the new dependant variable.  
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remarkable as table 3 presented an opposite result. This indicates that price 
convergence in the services sector can to a significant extent be attributed to 
catching up; 
· Comparing the development between EU and non-EU countries (specifications 5 
and 6), significant differences are evident, as expected. Prices for equipment goods 
and services in non-EU countries have converged more relative to consumer goods. 
In both country groupings, prices in the energy-sector have converged less than for 
consumer goods; 
· Tradables in the EU have not performed significantly better than non-tradables. This 
result seems to be due to the fact that very different product categories have been 
lumped together in this composite category (see Table 2);  
· Neither high- nor medium-NTB sectors have been able to achieve a more significant 
increase in price similarity compared to the low NTB sectors; the performance of 
medium-NTB sectors is not significantly different from low-NTB-sectors. 
 
The disadvantage of estimating separate equations for EU and non-EU countries is that 
it does not allow one to directly compare progress in EU-countries with those in other 
OECD-countries. Using the methodology illustrated above, we below investigate some 
of the properties of the sample along various dimensions (country grouping, product 
category and time). We illustrate the results graphically.  
 
Figure 3 shows the results of estimations replicating equations 1 and 2 for different time 
periods. The figure shows that in all periods some progress was made, but price 
convergence was especially high in the period 1990-1993 and (somewhat less) in 1996-
1999. The difference between the weighted and unweighted specifications is again not 
high, with the exception of 1996-1999.  
 
Figure 3: Coefficient of EU-variable in various sub-periods  
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Figure 4 compares the performance of EU- and non-EU countries for different types of 
products and during different sub-periods. For most products, EU -countries have 
consistently outperformed non-EU-countries, most notably in consumer goods and in 
energy. For consumer goods and services (which represent the majority of products and 
expenditures), progress was highest in 1990-1993. After that, progress slowed down 
somewhat, only to accelerate again in 1996-1999. Over all periods, performance in 
construction is least convincing. 
 
Figure 4: Coefficient of EU-variable in various sub-periods for various types of 
products 
 
Figure 5 compares the weighted and unweighted development of price convergence 
between EU- and non-EU countries for various types of products. Again, the differences 
between the weighted and unweighted estimations are small. For consumer goods and 
services, expenditure weighted progress has been higher than non-weighted 
convergence, indicating that progress has occurred in relatively important sectors. 
 
Overall, the evidence on price convergence within the EU is quite positive. Once one 
corrects for differences in initial similarity and various other variables, prices in the EU 
have converged significantly faster than in other OECD-countries. This result holds 
almost across all product categories and time periods. Within the EU, price convergence 
was highest for consumer goods, followed by services and equipment goods. 
Convergence in the energy- and construction-sectors is lagging behind.  
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Figure 5: Coefficient of EU-variable for various types of products (weighted and 
unweighted estimations) 
 
4. The Implications of EMU for price convergence 
 
It is important to ask whether the creation of the European Monetary Union will provide 
additional incentives to agents and governments to adjust behaviours and policies in a 
direction which favours a more competitive environment in the labour and product 
markets, with possible beneficial effects on employment. Monetary integration is likely 
to affect the level of competition, e.g. by facilitating price comparisons across countries. 
In principle, increased transparency raises opportunities for arbitrage by consumers and 
competitive pressures for producers. As a result, the convergence of prices across 
countries should be accelerated, even though differences will remain due to factors 
related to location, tastes, etc. Monetary integration may also bring about changes in 
behaviour of private agents conducive to increased (nominal) wage and price flexibility 
and changes in institutions and structural policies which lead to a reduction of real 
rigidities.  
 
The objective of this section is to discuss whether the experience of a subset of EU 
countries that participated in an exchange rate stability zone, has been significantly 
different from the EU -countries which did not participate in such an area. This 
comparison may be considered as a crude proxy for the possible effects Economic and 
Monetary Union might have on convergence of price structures. The presence of such 
changes could be interpreted as evidence that monetary integration encourages 
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fundamental reforms in the labour and product markets, making the abandonment of 
independent monetary policy beneficial also on this ground.  
 
It is important to keep in mind, however, that price convergence may be influenced by 
many factors, of which monetary integration is only one. Secondly, the experience of 
the so-called D-Mark area may be a rather specific historical episode, characterised by 
specific institutional and regulatory developments, which may hamper its usefulness as 
a benchmark for what might happen in EMU.  
 
Nevertheless, at the risk of over-simplifying complicated historical developments, in the 
following we distinguish between the “D-Mark area”, i.e. Germany, the Benelux-
countries and Austria, on the one hand, and the rest of the EU on the other hand. The 
countries in the D-Mark area all succeeded achieving relative monetary stability by 
pegging their exchange rate to the D-Mark over more than a decade (Austria, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg). The other EU-countries consist of countries which 
entered the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System in 1979 but 
underwent frequent and significant adjustments of their parities (eventually leading to 
their temporary or permanent exit from the system), countries that entered EMS at a late 
stage and countries that never participated in the exchange rate arrangement. Changes in 
exchange rates were particularly important at the beginning of the 1980s, with 
especially Portugal and Greece experiencing major depreciations of their currencies 
against the ECU. However, exchange rate fluctuations have remained important also in 
subsequent years in the majority of EU-countries, culminating in the EMS currency 
crises of the early 1990s.  
 
As a starting point, it is important to establish whether overall process of convergence 
documented in section 3 could have resulted merely from changes in exchange rates. 
While the countries in the D-mark area saw their currencies appreciate relative to the 
ECU since the mid-1980s, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy experienced major 
depreciations against the ECU. According to the theory of (relative) purchasing power 
parities, changes in the exchange rate between two currencies should, in the long run, 
equal the difference in the percentage changes of the national price levels. Given that 
the countries with relatively low prices were typically the countries which experienced 
exchange rate depreciations, in the vast majority of cases, changes in exchange rates 
have favoured an increased divergence in prices. For example, in 1980, the lowest price 
countries were Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy, whereas the highest price countries 
were Denmark, France and Germany. In 1993, the low price countries were Portugal, 
Greece and the UK, while the high price countries were still Denmark, France and 
Germany. Therefore, the observed convergence in prices between the low-price and 
high-price countries cannot be attributed to exchange rate variations (EC, 1997a). On 
the other hand, convergence could perhaps have been higher had there been more 
exchange rate stability. 
 
Table 7 presents some indicative results for the development in our price similarity 
indicator within the D-Mark area and within the rest of the EU. The level of price 
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similarity is much higher within the D-Mark area. In addition, countries in the D-Mark 
area already formed a relatively integrated group before the start of the pegged 
exchange rate regimes. However, price convergence has been substantially higher 
among the countries outside the D-mark area. This holds for all product categories 
except for construction (where the change in similarity is equal). Progress has been 
especially high in the most recent period (1996-1999), as almost half of the 
development in price similarity occurred during that period. Within the D-Mark area, 
prices are actually highly similar across all product goods categories, with the possible 
exception of services.  
 
Table 7: Price similarity indices at the basic goods heading, 1985-1999 
(unweighted) 
 
 1985 1990 1993 1996 1999 Change 
 
      1996-1999 1985-1999 
D-Mark area        
All products 90,0 90,7 90,4 90,8 91,3 0,5 1,3 
   Consumer goods 91,2 91,7 92,1 92,5 93,1 0,6 1,9 
   Equipment goods 91,0 92,0 90,2 90,1 89,0 -1,1 -2,0 
   Construction 92,5 90,7 90,4 90,8 91,6 0,8 -0,9 
   Services 85,7 87,8 86,9 87,0 88,5 1,5 2,8 
   Energy 91,6 88,9 86,4 91,8 91,5 -0,3 -0,1 
Other EU        
All products 81,2 80,7 84,0 84,0 86,5 2,5 5,3 
   Consumer goods 82,2 81,3 85,4 85,3 88,9 3,6 6,7 
   Equipment goods 88,3 87,8 88,5 89,7 87,9 -1,8 -0,4 
   Construction 84,7 84,5 85,5 84,3 83,8 -0,5 -0,9 
   Services 74,3 75,0 78,7 78,8 81,8 3,0 7,5 
   Energy 83,4 77,3 76,4 77,9 83,9 6,0 0,5 
D-Mark area = Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Austria. 
Other EU = ten remaining EU countries. 
 
In Table 8, we check whether there are significant differences in price convergence 
between these two groups, after controlling for initial conditions and other variables. 
The first two specifications show the results for all OECD countries. All variables again 
have the expected sign. Consistent with the results of the previous section, price 
convergence in both the D-Mark area and the rest of the EU has been higher than in the 
rest of the OECD. Price convergence in the D-Mark area also seems to be higher than in 
the rest of the EU. To check whether price convergence in the D-Mark area has been 
significantly higher than in the rest of the EU, in specification 3 we re -estimate equation 
2 while restricting the sample to EU -countries only. The results indicate that price 
convergence among the D-Mark countries has been significantly higher than among the 
rest of the EU. This shows that the difference in observed price convergence (see Table 
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7) can largely be explained by the catching-up of non-D-Mark-area participants. The 
alternative specifications 4 through 6 in Table 6 yield the same qualitative results.  
 
Table 8: Estimates of bilateral similarity equations including EMS-dummies.  
(Dependent variable: change in price similarity over 1985-1999) 
 
Notes: the D-Mark dummy has the value on e if the dependant variable corresponds to two 
countries from the following group: Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. The 
Other EU dummy has the value one for all pairs of EU countries not belonging to the core 
EMS-group. The 5%-significance level for the equality of DM and non-DM coefficients is 
3,84. 
 
Just like in the previous section, we test whether it is appropriate to combine the sub-
samples for the EMS-countries and the other EU-countries when looking at specific 
product categories. F-tests were performed by comparing the error sum of squares for 
three groups of countries and various product categories, while also taking into account 
Specification 
 
Variables 
1 
unweighted 
all 
2 
weighted 
all 
3 
weighted 
EU 
4 
weighted 
EU 
5 
weighted 
EU 
6 
weighted 
EU 
Initial similarity  -0,4 
(-7,5) 
-0,5 
(-10,4) 
-0,6 
(-13,1) 
-0,6 
(-18,0) 
-0,7 
(-19,9) 
-0,5 
(-19,4) 
Expenditure share 1,9 
(1,6) 
4,4 
(3,2) 
1,4 
(1,2) 
1,8 
(2,0) 
2,7 
(2,6) 
4,1 
(2,2) 
Trade intensity -0,3 
(-1,3) 
-0,5 
(-1,7) 
-0,3 
(-0,9) 
   
D-Mark  5,5 
(3,2) 
6,2 
(3,1) 
2,5 
(2,2) 
3,7 
(3,4) 
2,5 
(3,5) 
2,3 
(2,2) 
Other EU  3,6 
(6,1) 
4,6 
(6,9) 
    
Construction    -6,6 
(-7,5) 
  
Equipment goods    -2,3 
(-2,8) 
  
Energy     -5,9 
(-7,6) 
  
Services    -1,6 
(-1,8) 
  
High NTB     -1,5 
(-3,6) 
 
Medium NTB     -0,3 
(-0,7) 
 
Tradable      0,7 
(1,1) 
Constant 28,4 
(7,6) 
36,0 
(10,0) 
49,3 
(13,9) 
53,5 
(18,4) 
63,0 
(21,7) 
46,2 
(19,5) 
No. of observations 210 210 91 455 273 182 
R2 (adjusted) 28,1 43,1 71,8 60,2 65,0 70,4 
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the higher average rate of price convergence among EMS-countries. Interestingly, the 
results show that the hypothesis of identical coefficients between EMS and non-EMS 
countries could not be rejected, while it could be rejected in the previous section (non-
identical coefficients for EU and non-EU-countries). This confirms that the EU is a 
relatively integrated market. While noting that EMS-countries have displayed a higher 
degree of price convergence compared to other EU -countries, the pattern of price 
convergence within the EU does not differ significantly among EMS- and non-EMS-
countries. 
 
Figures 6 and 7 show the results for various time periods and product categories. 
Progress in price convergence has been relatively high during 1985-1990 and 1996-
1999. Price convergence relative to the rest of the EU was lowest during 1993-1996, 
confirming previous findings (Nicoeletti et al., 2001). Compared to the rest of the EU, 
convergence in energy and services has been relatively high.  
 
Figure 6: Coefficient of D-Mark variable in various periods, weighted and 
unweighted 
 
 
The increase in relative price convergence in the most recent period in the D-Mark 
countries may be partially explained by the convergence in inflation rates at the start of 
EMU. Inflation rates indeed displayed a significant convergence as the final stage of 
EMU came closer and closer. As inflation in the D-Mark area was already relatively 
low, this implied a relative decline in inflation rates in the rest of the EU, slowing down 
the pace of relative price convergence between the two groupings. In this way, price 
convergence in the D-Mark area relative to the rest of the EU could increase.  
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Figure 7: Coefficient of D-Mark variable for various types of products (weighted 
and unweighted estimates) 
 
The results of this section give some foundation to hopes that monetary union will 
promote price convergence, especially because private agents probably have not 
attributed as much credibility to the EMS arrangement (even in the countries with 
relatively stable bilateral exchange rates) as a full monetary union such as EMU might 
have. Exchange rate uncertainty and a lack of price transparency is likely to have 
persisted to some extent, which may have had a negative effect on price convergence. 
As EMU is a much more credible and irrevocable form of monetary union, it may have 
a more substantial impact on price convergence.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Before turning to the main conclusions of the paper, it is useful to recall some of the 
limitations which are inherent to international price comparisons. Firstly, product 
categories across countries may not be completely identical. Secondly, improvements in 
data collection methods and changes in product categories (e.g. quality improvements, 
new products) make intertemporal comparisons more difficult. Finally, it should be 
noted that although the empirical analysis makes use of price data for almost 200 
product categories, the level of aggregation may still be too high to fully capture the 
process of price convergence. An analysis at an even lower level of aggregation might 
well reveal a considerable degree of heterogeneity at the level of individual products. 
However, the data used in this paper are the best ones available. They were composed 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Consumer
goods
Construction Equipment
goods
Energy Services
Weighted Unweighted
 28 
by the national statistical agencies, Eurostat and the OECD with great care and are 
widely used to make price comparisons and to investigate broad price trends. We 
therefore look at our results with some confidence.  
 
Overall, the evidence on price convergence within the EU is quite positive. Once one 
corrects for differences in initial similarity and various other variables, prices in the EU 
have converged significantly faster than in other OECD-countries. This result holds 
almost across all product categories and time periods. The empirical analysis also 
confirms that the EU is already a relatively integrated market, as sub-sets of EU -
countries tend to display similar patterns of price convergence. The results also show 
that the progress in price convergence should be evaluated while taking initial 
conditions into account, as the scope for convergence is higher when initial similarity is 
lower.  
 
Within the EU, price convergence was highest for consumer goods, followed by 
services and equipment goods. Convergence in the energy- and construction-sectors is 
lagging behind. The fact that price convergence in the EU at the aggregate level of 
almost 200 product categories has progressed, however, does not mean that price 
differences have disappeared entirely. Price difference can still be substantial for 
specific product categories, such as fresh products or consumer electronics.  
 
Price convergence within the D-Mark area has been significantly higher than in the rest 
of the EU. This shows that monetary integration can go hand in hand with price 
convergence, even when the level of price similarity is already relatively high. 
However, whether the price convergence in the D-Mark area is representative of the 
possible effect EMU may have on prices remains an open question. One possible reason 
is that the experience of the D-Mark-area may be a rather specific historical episode. In 
addition, price convergence is determined by many factors, of which the monetary 
regime is only one. For example, structural reforms also play an important role in 
achieving further progress in this area. Therefore, it is not possible to establish causality 
between price convergence and changes in other (explanatory) variables, including the 
exchange rate regime. The results do provide underpinnings to the view that significant 
progress can still be achieved in the EU, provided that market integration is supported 
by structural reforms.  
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